Daniel DePetris

A decade ago, the Houthis were a ragtag group of fighters based in the north of Yemen that most people hadn’t even heard of. Today, the movement-turned-de facto government in Yemen is causing so much trouble in the Red Sea that some of the world’s largest shipping companies are no longer sailing through its waters.

Since the Israel-Hamas war erupted Oct. 7, the Houthis have taken potshots against civilian vessels in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait chokepoint heading into the Red Sea. Attack drones and ballistic missiles have been launched from Houthi-controlled areas along Yemen’s coastline, some of which have caused minor damage. U.S. warships in the area have responded to multiple distress calls. On Dec. 16, the USS Carney shot down 14 one-way drones in what has been the most significant armed engagement in those waters to date.

As you would expect, companies aren’t thrilled with the idea of taking their chances and traveling through an area that looks increasingly like a war zone. Insurance for ships carrying everything from oil to agricultural products are now at sky-high rates. BP, the energy conglomerate, is no longer using the Red Sea out of an abundance of caution. More than 100 container ships that would ordinarily sail through the Red Sea as a shortcut toward the Suez Canal have taken the longer journey around Africa to get to the same destination.

President Joe Biden’s administration recognizes it has a problem. U.S. officials have weighed military options against the Houthis. Yet for a president who is seeking to prevent the Israel-Hamas war from spreading to the region’s other fault lines, U.S. strikes on the Houthis would run the risk of doing exactly that. Analysts and pundits advocating for U.S. military action in Yemen fail to appreciate the escalatory nature of their recommendation. Some key countries in the Middle East would agree; Saudi Arabia has advised restraint on the part of the U.S. over concern that its own set of peace talks with the group would collapse otherwise.

The U.S., however, can’t be seen as doing nothing. The administration therefore has organized a multinational task force to preserve freedom of navigation. The Pentagon’s chief spokesman described the task force as similar to a “highway patrol,” responsible for assisting vessels if requested.

These are very general comments, and there are more questions than answers about how the maritime task force will actually work. The entire project feels like a haphazard enterprise. Assuming the rules of engagement have been agreed upon, they remain mysterious to the public. Presumably, the task force is strictly a defensive mission.

What that means in practice, though, is to be determined. Does this mean the U.S., United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, and the rest of the coalition will stick with neutralizing Houthi drones and missiles as they screech through the air, akin to establishing an ad hoc air defense system off Yemeni waters? What happens if a missile or drone manages to cause severe damage to a ship? Would such a scenario prompt the U.S. and its partners to return fire, perhaps by striking at the source? And is the coalition prepared for Houthi retaliation?

It wouldn’t be a surprise if the coalition was still working through the answers to these questions.

Its membership has also come under scrutiny — for good reason. Outside of Bahrain, the states most affected by trade flows through the Red Sea have chosen to stay away. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates aren’t participating, the former because it doesn’t want to do anything the Houthis could misconstrue as an aggression. (The two remain locked in peace talks over the civil war in Yemen.) Egypt, which administers the Suez Canal and received more than $9 billion in transit revenue this year, isn’t a part of the effort either.

China sources most of its oil from the Middle East and yet has stayed on the sidelines despite U.S. attempts to cajole Beijing into taking a greater share of the responsibility for enforcing freedom of navigation in the region’s waters. Such a rejection isn’t a surprise since China is in no mood to grant the U.S. any favors when it sees U.S. policy as overtly hostile to its interests.

Of course, all of this is coming at a time when combat between Israeli and Hamas forces continues at a steady clip, with no sign the fighting is about to taper off. While truce talks have gained momentum, they are designed to create the conditions for more prisoner and hostage releases, not to necessarily end the conflict. More than 20,000 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza in the 11-week war, according to health officials.

The Houthis claim that attacks on ships in the Red Sea will persist until one of two things happens: Israel stops bombing Gaza, or the international community finds a way to send far more humanitarian aid into the enclave. At the time of writing, the United Nations Security Council is in the closing stages of negotiations that would establish a monitoring mechanism in the area to ensure aid gets to where it needs to go. Whether or not the Houthis’ position is genuine is difficult to say. But if it is genuine, then the Biden administration has even more of an incentive to push Israel into winding down operations in Gaza.

At best, the U.S.-led maritime coalition is a placeholder between now and when the Israel-Hamas war ends. At worst, it will instigate a whole new set of problems that Washington and its partners will be forced to contend with.

Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.